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Philosophy in the twentieth century has been char-
acterized by its attempt to give an account of the 
meaning of both words and sentences of language. The 
goal of such effort is to render philosophical ques-
tions and their proposed answers as clear and precise 
as possible. In this way it is believed that many 
philosophical difficulties may be resolved. It is in 
this tradition that we find Wittgenstein's Philos-
ophical Investigations. Whatever else this work may 
be, it is certainly a major work in the philosophy of 
language. In this paper I will examine this philosophy 
of language and suggest that it may be interpreted as 
an early example of what recently has been called an 
'anti-realist' theory of meaning.' 
What I propose to examine are Wittgenstein's argu-
ments against certain kinds of theories of meaning 
which may all be called 'realist' theories of meaning. 
These arguments all rest upon Wittgenstein's concep-
tions of language games and his famous dictum that 
"meaning is use." 2 After presenting what I take to be 
Wittgenstein's position regarding these matters I will 
try to show that Wittgenstein 'offers' an alternate 
theory of meaning which is satisfactory with respect to 
his objections to previous theories of meaning. 
Finally, I will try and bring out certain consequences 
of these arguments. 
First I want to consider Wittgenstein's rejection 
of 'realist' theories of meaning. By 'realist' I do 
not mean the traditional 'realism' of the realist/nom-
inalist debate or realist/phenomenalist debate. Ra-
ther, by 'realist' I mean the recent characterization 
of Dummett's which makes 'realism' a feature of a 
theory of meaning for 'a language. 1 Realism in this 
sense is a view that accepts the principle of bi-
valence; that is, it is the view that every sentence of 
the language is either true or false with no third 
possibility. More importantly, this principle holds 
independently of us. What this says is that an inde-
pendent reality (whatever it may be like) renders our 
sentences determinately true or false. Examples of 
such theories are the philosophies of language of 
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Russell, Frege and, of course, Wittgenstein's Trac-
tatus.* Generally, referential theories of meaning are 
•"realist' in the above sense. They give an account of 
the meanings of the primitive terms of the language by 
equating a term's meaning with its referent. The mean-
ings of 'atomic' sentences are given by their agreement 
or disagreement with states of affairs; i.e. whether 
certain predicates are 'true of' the terms. Once the 
basic sentences' truth-values are specified (thus 
fixing their meanings) the remainder of the sentences' 
meanings may be explained by showing how their truth-
values are determined by their structure. This is done 
with a recursive definition that specifies for each 
logical form of sentence the way in which its component 
sentences' truth-values determine the truth-value of 
the whole. This may be done using truth tables for 
non-quantificational languages and some notion such as 
satisfaction by all sequences or truth under all inter-
pretations for quantificational languages. Take, for 
example, the sentence 'John is happy and wise'. We can 
specify the meaning of this sentence by first noting 
that the meaning of 'John' is John and that both 'John 
is wise' and 'John is happy' are true. That is, each 
atomic sentence agrees with the actual state of 
affairs. Finally the entire conjunction is true since 
each conjunct is true. In this way we can (it is 
claimed) understand the meaning of the sentence in 
question. 
Wittgenstein rejects all such accounts of meaning. 
Broadly speaking, his reason for rejecting these real-
ist theories is that they do not take the use of lan-
guage into account. Wittgenstein sees the actual use 
of terms and sentences as at least a necessary compo-
nent of their meaning. 
We can, I think, distinguish two aspects of 'use' 
which are central to Wittgenstein's rejection of real-
ist theories of meaning. The first of these is brought 
out in the notion of a language game.* Language games 
are best introduced by example. Take the sentence 'The 
broom is broken'. How are we to determine the meaning 
of this sentence? Realist theories of meaning will 
straightforwardly analyse this as consisting of a term 
'the broom' and a predicate 'is broken*. The meaning 
of 'the broom' is the broom and 'is broken' is predi-
cated of the broom. If this agrees with reality the 
sentence is true; if not, then it is false. The use of 
the sentence plays no part in any of this and for this 
reason Wittgenstein rejects the analysis. 
How can we use the above sentence? To use the ex-
amples mentioned by Wittgenstein, I can use it to 
'describe the appearance of an object', to report on a 
situation, to speculate about a situation, to form an 
hypothesis, as a line in a fictional story, as the 
punch-line of a joke and many other uses.' By consid-
ering these varied uses one sees that the meaning of 
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the sentence will change depending upon the use it is 
put to. That is, the language game being played is a 
central factor in how the sentence is to be understood. 
Suppose that the sentence 'the broom is broken' was 
used as a warning not to use the broom. The realist 
account which amounts to describing a 'picture' of a 
broken broom will absolutely fail to convey the meaning 
as a warning. Once the sentence is understood as a 
warning, the realist account may give the necessary ad-
ditional information needed to express the sentence's 
meaning, but not before. Realist, truth-condition, 
theories of meaning don't recognize the distinctions of 
meaning that different language games impose on lan-
guage. 
The second argument against realist theories of 
meaning that involves the 'meaning is use' thesis fo-
cuses upon the public nature of linguistic usage. When 
we specify the meaning of, say, a sentence we must be 
providing information that is both learnable and man-
ifestable; that is usable 7 If we suppose that the 
meaning of some utterance was such that it was not 
learnable then it immediately becomes impossible for 
that utterance to play a part in any language game, for 
how could anyone come to know how to use it? Not only 
does the meaning of the utterance have to be learnable, 
it also must be manifestable. Suppose that someone was 
informed about the meaning of some expression in a lan-
guage that he doesn't understand. Suppose also that 
this meaning is not manifestable in any way by the 
recipient of the information. What could possibly 
count as constituting his understanding? Nothing he 
does or could do would be different whether he knows 
the meaning or not. To know the meaning of an expres-
sion is to know how to do something; to be able to use 
the sentence. 
These requirements of learnability and manitesta-
bility of meaning are what Wittgenstein has partly in 
mind with the 'meaning is use' slogan. And it is pre-
cisely on these points that the realist theories of 
meaning fail. In particular, it is their realist as-
pect that causes this failure. 
In a realist theory of meaning the principle of 
bivalence allows one to establish and assert as true 
every instance of the schema 'Either A or not A*. This 
schema is known as the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM). 
Although bivalence and LEM are often taken to be the 
same thing, this is not accurate. While the principle 
of bivalence does entail the LEM, since one can assert 
'A' when given that A is true and 'Not A' when A is 
false (thus in either case 'A or Not A' follows), the 
LEM does not entail bivalence. A necessary condition 
for the entailment of the principle bivalence from the 
LEM is the ability to assert" 'A' is true" from 'A* and 
"'A' is false" from 'Not A', but neither inference is 
correct unless bivalence is already accepted. Thus, 
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because bivalence entails the LEM, an attack on the LEM 
is also an attack on bivalence. 
The importance of the principle of bivalence lies 
in the fact that it allows one to assert the LEM inde-
pendently of the speakers of the language; that is, one 
may assert any instance of the LEM without knowing 
which of the disjuncts is in fact true. It is the uni-
versal holding of the LEM that provides one good case 
for rejecting any realist theory of meaning. 
"Either he has such an image in his mind or he does 
not."* Here we have an instance of the LEM and it is 
true under a realist theory of meaning. If I under-
stand the meaning of this sentence how do I manifest my 
knowledge? By being able (in principle) to determine 
that one of the disjuncts is true. Fine, but suppose 
that neither of the disjuncts is effectively decidable 
(as in this example). That is to say that the criteria 
for the determination of the truth of the disjuncts is 
not public or testable. How can I manifest the 
knowledge of the sentence's meaning? What can I do 
that reveals that I know the meaning? It is not enough 
that I say that I know the meaning, for how could I be 
wrong? The requirement of public meaning is a require-
ment that my knowledge claim can be shown to be mista-
ken. But in this case this possibility is ruled out. 
Consequently, I must do more that say that I know the 
meaning of the sentence; I must be able to do some-
thing. Since, in a case like this example, no such 
manifestation of knowledge can be forthcoming, one is 
not entitled to claim an understanding of the sen-
tence' s meaning. But if one does not know the meaning 
of a sentence one cannot assert that sentence. Thus we 
must conclude that "IEither he has such an image in his 
mind or he does not' is neither true nor false if we 
want to require that the knowledge of a sentence's 
meaning (truth-conditions) be manifestable. 
Briefly, for the realist to know the meaning of a 
sentence is to know the conditions under which it would 
be true. But to know this amounts to knowing when it 
is correct to assert the sentence. Since some sen-
tences do not admit of such knowledge, one cannot say 
that they are true nor know their meaning. A similar 
argument goes through for purported falsehoods that are 
undecidable. 
What Wittgenstein's arguments do, then, is deny the 
principle of bivalence; for it entails the truth of the 
LEM in every case, but for some sentences the LEM is 
not true (which isn't to say that it is false). If the 
LEM is not true, then the principle of bivalence is not 
true either. The key to his argument is that meanings 
must be public; i.e. one must be able to manifest 
knowledge of meaning if one has such knowledge at all. 
So, when we combine the two lines of argument we get 
the following view of the realist theories of meaning: 
(1) they are incapable of determining the language game 
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being played for a particular utterance of a sentence 
and hence not yielding the correct meaning of the sen-
tence in that game; (2) even within a predetermined 
language game the realist theories of meaning yield 
contradictions, the LEM is both true and not true. It 
is not hard to see why Wittgenstein wants to reject any 
such realist theory of meaning. 
A great deal follows from this. Much of the so-
called private language argument comes from the rejec-
tion of the principle of bivalence, for it is then no 
longer legitimate to assert sentences like 'Either he 
is in pain or he is not whether we can tell or not'. 
Other areas of philosophy are affected as well. We get 
hints about the philosophy of mathematics in Witt-
genstein's examples about the sequence '777' occurring 
in the expansion of pi. 9 Namely, mathematical argu-
ments such as 'Either 777 occurs or it does not. If it 
does, then C. If not, then C. Therefore, C.' would 
no longer be valid. It appears to follow as well that 
quantification over undecidable domains would also be 
disallowed. Generally, any philosophical position that 
presupposes a world independent of language (i.e. of 
us) cannot be acceptable. The rejection of realist 
theories of meaning also suggests a new job for philo-
sophy (perhaps the only one). When philosophical pro-
blems arise the philosopher probably is invoking a 
realist theory of meaning. By 'breaking' this 'fly-
bottle' with this anti-x*ealist argument one resolves a 
great many philosophical problems. 
Having considered Wittgentein's negative theses 
about certain theories of meaning I want to move on to 
see if there is a positive side to the philosophy of 
language presented in the Investigations. I want to 
suggest that although he clearly does not offer any 
such theory of meaning explicitly, Wittgenstein's crit-
icisms of realist theories of meaning implicitly con-
tain the basic elements of an adequate (on his own 
grounds) theory of meaning which one could call 'anti-
realist' . 
Recall that Wittgenstein's arguments against real-
ist theories of meaning fell into two groups. There 
were the arguments concerning the inability of these 
theories to handle different language games. And there 
were the arguments which rule out any theory invoking 
the principle of bivalence. Let us look at each group 
separately. 
When one sets out to give a theory of meaning for a 
language one clearly wants one for the entire language; 
since it is impossible to isolate a fragment of lan-
guage for study. Thus, when we construe the realist 
theories of language as theories for the entire lan-
guage we run afoul of the fact that a given sentence 
may be used for a variety of purposes. Consequently, 
the meaning of the sentence will vary from language 
game to language game. The realist theories, however, 
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did not capture this variation in meaning since they 
specified meaning strictly in terms of reference and 
truth-value. 
Is there any way to reformulate these realist 
theories so that they can work for the entire language? 
One proposal that seems quite natural to make is to 
have some part of the theory of meaning itself deter-
mine the language game within which the utterance is 
made and then appropriately transform the sentence into 
another sentence which, when analysed in terms of ref-
erence and truth-value, gives the meaning of the o-
riginal utterance. This is, in fact, what recent the-
ories of meaning propose to do. The idea is due to 
Dummett. 1* This fragment of the theory of meaning he 
calls the theory of force and it consists of three 
parts: (1) A component that spots the mode of ut-
terance, the type of speech act performed, done along 
the lines of work by Strawson, Grice, Searle and 
others; (2) a syntactic theory that spots grammatical 
moods; (3) a transformational component which takes the 
utterance along with the mode and mood and transforms 
it into a related indicative sentence which is then 
subjected to a meaning analysis in the old way. Of 
course no such theory of force yet exists, but work is 
being done by a variety of people and there seems to be 
no Wittgensteinian objection to such a theory in prin-
ciple. Or is there? 
Suppose there are infinitely many language games. 
That is to say that a given sentence may be used in in-
finitely many ways, in infinitely many speech acts all 
of which are different. How could the theory of force 
possibly be able to spot them all? It would have to be 
an infinite theory and as such would hardly count as a 
theory. Thus, it may appear that no theory of meaning 
can be given. But Wittgenstein has a type of argument 
that seems to suggest otherwise. 
When one speaks of 'infinitely many' language games 
what does one mean? Surely Wittgenstein would not ac-
cept the view that language as a whole is equivalent to 
an actual infinity of language/games. For him the 'in-
finity 1 of language games would consist in always being 
able to construct another language game. The idea is 
like that expressed in his 'no last house on the 
street' example. Just because you can construct 
another one doesn't mean that there isn't a last one. 
Given this view of infinity, the proposed objection 
vanishes. Language as a whole consists in a finite 
number of language games. Thus the theory of force may 
D e finite with a distinct set of operations for each 
speech act and grammatical mood. True, one could then 
construct a new speech act, but then we could just add 
a new clause to the theory. "Do not say: 'There isn't 
a "last" (clause.)' That is just as if you choose to 
say: 'There isn't a last house on this road; one can 
always build an additional one."" 1 Thus we appear to 
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have met the first of Wittgenstein's objections to a 
realist theory of meaning. What about the second? 
The first of Wittgenstein's objections really con-
tained its own solution. 'The theory doesn't do such 
and so'. So, one adds on to the theory to make it do 
'such and so'. The second objection is more profound, 
however. It is not that the principle of bivalence 
fails to deal with certain features of language. 
Rather, it is that the principle is incoherent given 
certain other of Wittgenstein's other theses; i.e. the 
'use' criteria of meaning. Here the examples of unde-
cidable sentences are so clear that I see no way of 
saving the principle of bivalence and hence realism 
must be given up. Does this destroy the chances for a 
theory of meaning? No, and again the answer comes from 
Dummett. Replace the referential/truth-conditions the-
ory with a theory based upon assertibility. 1 1 The 
semantics would in many respects resemble that of the 
realist theory. One would specify the meanings of 
terms by showing how one would come to recognize the 
referent. One then would specify the meanings of the-
atomic sentences by showing how to verify and falsify 
them. And finally one would give a recursive specifi-
cation of the truth-values of complex sentences in 
terms of their components. For example, 'If A then B' 
would be explained as ' given a verification of A one 
can construct a verification of B'. In this way one 
can have a systematic theory of meaning that meets the 
requirements of 'meaning is use' in that knowledge of 
the meaning of any sentence would be manifestable in 
terms of verification. Of course certain sentences 
would remain neither true nor false and consequently 
their meanings would remain incomplete. Such a theory 
already exists for an important fragment of language. 
This is the intuitionistic logic that underlies intui-
tionistic mathematics. Verification here consists in 
proof. Although none of the details are to be found in 
the Investigations, I am inclined to think that they 
would be readily accepted by Wittgenstein since they do 
seem to take care of the use criteria. (It is also in-
teresting to note that it was the intuitionist Brouwer 
who inspired Wittgenstein to return to philosophy in 
the 1930's). 
We now seem to have constructed a theory of meaning 
for language that meets both of Wittgenstein's objec-
tions to certain theories of meaning. It accounts for 
the various uses of a sentence within language and it 
also keeps meaningful sentences in line with the re-
quirement of public manifestibility. But this theory 
was gained at some cost. We were forced to abandon 
'realism*. We can no longer speak about an independent 
reality rendering our sentences true and false regard-
less of our ability to recognize it. If sentences may 
be neither true nor false then it cannot be the world 
that they neither agree nor disagree with. It is we 
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through our language who bring the world into reality. 
Wittgenstein doesn't speak in precisely this way, but 
clearly he is in agreement here. For him, "grammar 
tells what kind of object anything i s " 1 1 "One ought to 
ask, not what (a's) are . . . , but how the word 'a' is 
used." 1* This 'constructed' world remains objective, 
however, since language is objective and public. 
Hence, for speakers of a language, reality will remain 
objectively constant across speakers. 
I hope to have shown that one can reasonably take 
Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations to be the 
forerunner of recent anti-realist theories of meaning, 
notably the theory of Michael Dummett. Given the na-
ture of the Investigations, however, I fear that this 
interpretation may not be entirely consistent with 
Wittgenstein's expressed positions in the Investiga-
tions. But then this may not be verifiable. 
NOTES 
'Many of the ideas I present in this paper I owe to 
the work of Michael Dummett. His ideas on the philoso-
phy of language will be found throughout the paper. 
'Philosophical Invesitagations,§43. 
'Almost all of Dummett's work discusses 
realism/anti-realism. But a good place to start would 
be "Realism" in Truth and Other Enigmas. 
*Tractatus, 2.21 for example. 
*P.I.§§1-37 for example. 
'P.I.,§ 23. 
*P.I.,5190,§ 692 are fairly explicit. 
•FJ.. ,§051-369 for the discussion of the LEM. 
'P.I.,§ 352,§ 516. 
1 "See Platts' Introduction to Reference, Truth and 
Reality for a nice brief account of the theory of force 
and of recent theory of meaning in general. 
"P. I,§29. 
"See Dummett's Elements of Intuitionism for a very 
complete account of an ~* assertabi lity conditions' 
theory of meaning for mathematics. See also "Truth" in 
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Truth and Other Enigmas. Many of his other papers and 
books contain similar discussions. 
"P.I. ,§373. 
**P.I. ,§370. 
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